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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of land market liberalization on the dynamics of capital
accumulation. It is shown that the land market liberalization, which is accompanied
with the transfer of agricultural technology, may not always offer a “win-win” outcome
for developed and developing countries. Improved agricultural productivity generates
a growth enhancing externality. However, land market liberalization affects the balance
between the equalizing force of the diminishing returns technology and the
un-equalizing force of the low income elasticity of the agricultural commodity
demand. As a result, land market liberalization accompanied with the transfer of
agricultural productivity, may not always guarantee a “win-win” outcome for
developed and developing countries. If improvement of agricultural productivity is
insignificant then land market liberalization can cause “win-lose” situation for
developed and developing countries. This result suggests that one should be very
careful in a policy proposal designed to foster the process of development through
foreign land ownership. It is important to recognize that apart from benefits, foreign
land ownership also creates a disadvantage for capital accumulation and causes the
magnification of the world income inequality.
JEL classification: F43, O11, R14
Keywords: Dynamics of capital accumulation, Land market liberalization,
Transfer of agricultural technology
Background
Food prices, which almost doubled between 2006 and 2008, had a major impact on
the perception of food insecurity. Rising food prices hit hard to the balance of pay-
ments of many food importing countries. In order to insure themselves, those countries
started to acquire farmland under their control. Reports from the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimate that during the last decade tens of millions
of acres of farmland has been acquired by countries where the consumption of agricul-
tural commodities far exceeds the production (see Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (16)
for more details). Food-importing countries with land and water constraints but rich
in oil resources, such as the Gulf States, or countries with large populations and food
security concerns, such as China, Japan, India, and South Korea, are seeking opportuni-
ties to produce food and biofuel crops overseas (see Borras et al. (3) for more details).
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Land acquisitions are occurring mainly in developing countries like Brazil, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Madagascar, Pakistan, Philippines, Uganda, Sudan and others, where
production costs are relatively low and where land and water resources are more abun-
dant than in the investor nation (see Vidal (15), Cotula et al. (5), and Allen (1), for more
details).
Many powerful international institutions, such as The World Bank, the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, and the US Millennium Challenge Corporation,
are actively advising national governments in developing countries to allow a large-scale
acquisition of domestic land by foreigner investors (see Li (11) and World Bank (17)
among others). These international institutions argue that a large-scale land acquisition
is a way to reduce poverty through transfer of technology and technical know-how from
developed to developing countries and improve the overall efficiency in the agricultural
sector in general. While the robust empirical evidence about the impact of foreign land
ownership on economic growth is lacking, many developing countries have already sim-
plified their land ownership laws for foreign firms and governments.a The speed of land
acquisition has provoked opposition from farmers’ organizations, human rights groups,
and other social movements as they raise concerns that foreign land ownership can have a
negative impact on poor local people, who risk losing access to and control over the land
on which they depend too much.b In addition, unrestricted foreign land ownership could
cause a spike in property prices so that citizens of the low and middle class are never able
to afford land again.c
In the present paper, I take a small step toward reconciling two conflicting views about
land market liberalization: one is a “win-win” view, typically encouraged by the World
Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and the other “win-lose” (win for
rich and lose for poor) view, usually supported by numerous non-profit organizations
such as La Via Campesina, the Oakland Institute, GRAIN, Food First, and many others
(See for example Nierenberg and Pollack (13)). To this end, I analyze a general equilib-
rium model within which I can investigate the effects of land market liberalization on the
dynamics of capital accumulation and on the well-being of a nation. The world economy
consists of identical countries that differ in their levels of agricultural sector productivity
and the initial capital stock. The model is set up in such a way that, in the absence of land
market liberalization, a country with a relatively more productive agricultural sector con-
verges monotonically to a unique steady state and achieves higher capital stock, higher
wage income, higher consumption, and higher welfare in general.d This result can be
tempting to conclude that poor countries will benefit from the land market liberalization
if such liberalization comes with the transfer of more efficient agricultural technology. In
this paper I demonstrate that, as a result of land market liberalization, the unique steady
state can lose its stability property and two asymptotically stable steady states come in
existence. The unique steady state can become unstable because, with the integrated land
markets, the land price in different countriesmustmove together. This creates a disadvan-
tage for relatively poor countries because of low income elasticity of agricultural demand.
The land market will crowd out domestic investment in capital and will create a negative
spillover for next generations. That is to say, a low aggregate investment in capital low-
ers the income of the next generations of the same country, creating a downward spiral of
low-income/low-investment in capital. The opposite force will operate in a relatively rich
country which because of land market liberalization will face relatively low land prices.
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This will create an upward spiral of high-income/high-investment in capital. As a result,
a “win-win” outcome is not necessarily guaranteed through the land market liberalization
even if such liberalization comes with the improvement of agricultural sector productivity
in the relatively poor country.
The paper is organized as follows. Section The model introduces the model with a
simple, analytically tractable structure, which is capable of capturing the effect of the
land market integration on the dynamics of capital accumulation. Section The autarky
case demonstrates the existence and uniqueness of an interior steady state and show
its stability property under rational expectations dynamics. Section Two country model
considers the world economy in which foreign land ownership is allowed and the pro-
ductivity of agricultural sector is equalized. In such a set-up, I show that the foreign land
ownership right can cause the long-run divergence of otherwise symmetric economies.
Section Conclusions summarizes results and concludes.
Methods
Themodel
Let us consider an infinite-horizon, a standard neoclassical overlapping generations
model, modified only to include a landmarket.e The world economy consists of two coun-
tries: Country 1 and Country 2. Countries are identical in all respect except for their levels
of productivity in the agricultural sector and the initial capital stock.f In each period there
are two generations alive: young and old. Population size of each generation is constant
and normalized to unity. Agents supply one unit of labor while young and consume while
old. A single manufacturing commodity is produced by an infinitely lived neoclassical
firm which combines two factors of production, capital and labor.
The produced final commodity is usable for consumption and for investment. Per capita
output in country i = 1, 2, in period t, is yit = f (kit), where kit denotes the capital per
worker in Country i and f : R+ → R+ is the production function in intensive form. We
assume that the production function satisfies the standard neoclassical properties: f is
twice continuously differentiable onR++; continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly con-
cave, on R+; and satisfies the following boundary conditions, f (0) = 0, limk↓0 f ′(k) = ∞,
and limk↑∞ f ′(k) = 0. Factor markets are competitive and factor rewards are determined
according to the marginal product rule, i.e., at time t, the wage rate and the rate of return
on one unit of capital are given by W (k) := f (k) − kf ′(k) and f ′(k) respectively. Existing
capital depreciates fully within a period.
After receiving the wage income W (kit), young agents decide how much to invest in
capital and how much land to purchase in the competitive land market. Aggregate supply
of land in each country is fixed and normalized to unity. Productivity of land Ai > 0 in
each country is constant over time and is treated as an exogenous parameter. Purchase of
xit units of land implies the consumption of Aixit units of agricultural commodity. After
harvesting the agricultural commodity, land ownership can be sold in order to increase
the consumption of the manufacturing commodity.g
Purchasing xit units of land at price pit implies the following choice of investment in
capital W (kit) − xitpit , where xitpit is the spending on the land market. Since the rate
of return on capital is f ′(kit+1), it follows that the old agent’s consumption bundle is
(cit+1,Aixit), where cit+1 =
[
W (kit) − xitpit
]
f ′(kit+1) + xitpit+1. Thus the land market
serves two purposes: First, land can be used as an investment vehicle, because it is durable
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and consumers can re-sell it in the next period in order to increase their consumption
of manufacturing commodity. Second, land can be used as a consumption commodity,
because land owners harvest the agricultural commodity from which they derive utility.
Young agents choose the optimal levels of land/investment in capital by maximizing the
following utility function (cit+1, xit) → ln cit+1 + u(Aixit), where u is a twice continu-
ously differentiable on R++; continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave on R+;
and satisfies the following boundary condition, limx↓0 u′(x) = ∞.
Young agents take the pair of current - (kit , pit), and next period - (kit+1, pit+1), capital
stock and land price as given and maximize the following lifetime utility
ln
{[
W (kit) − xitpit
]
f ′(kit+1) + xitpit+1
}+ u(Aixit), (1)
by choosing an optimal land holding, xit . The first order condition implies that
(a) If pitf ′(kit+1) > pit+1, then the optimal level of land holding, xit , satisfiesh
pitf ′(kit+1) − pit+1[
W (kit) − xitpit
]
f ′(kit+1) + xitpit+1 = Aiu
′(Aixit). (2)
(b) If pitf ′(kit+1) ≤ pit+1, then it is optimal for young agents to invest all their wage
income into a land purchase and thus the optimal level of land holding is
xit = W (kit)pit . (3)
The autarky case
First let us consider the case of autarky, when all markets operate only domestically,
foreign land ownership is not allowed, and price of land is determined domestically. A
simple demographic structure of the consumption sector implies that young agents are
net demanders, while old agents are net suppliers of land. Since all markets operate only
domestically and the aggregate supply of land is constant and normalized to unity, it fol-
lows that xit = 1, for all t. This, with the assumptions of no first period consumption and
full depreciation of capital, implies that the capital stock in the next period is
kit+1 = W (kit) − pit . (4)
Suppose pitf ′(kit+1) ≤ pit+1, then xit = 1 implies that pit = W (kit) and thus kit+1 = 0.
This implies a contradiction with pitf ′(kit+1) ≤ pit+1 because limkit+1↓0 f ′(kit+1) = ∞.
Suppose pitf ′(kit+1) > pit+1, then xit = 1 with (2) implies that
pit+1 = (pit − U(Ai)W (kit)) f ′(kit+1) where U(Ai) := Aiu′(Ai)1+Aiu′(Ai) . (5)
Equations (4) and (5) together imply that the evolution of (kit , pit) in a closed economy
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(6) and (7) imply that the steady state pair (k∗i , p∗i ) satisfies the following system of
equations
pi = W (ki) − ki and pi = U(Ai)W (ki)f
′(ki)
f ′(ki) − 1 . (8)
After eliminating the steady state price of land, pi, from the above system and then re-
arranging terms, we obtain that the steady state capital, k∗i , should solve the following
equation
(ki) = U(Ai) where (k) :=
(
1 − kW (k)
) (
1 − 1f ′(k)
)
. (9)
In order to simplify the analysis and focus on the situation when there is a unique steady
state in a closed economy, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Suppose that the production and utility functions satisfy
(a) k → kW (k) is strictly increasing on R++ and limk↓0 kW (k) = 0;
(b) x → xu′(x) is strictly decreasing on R++;
Assumption 1.(a), can be interpreted as a restriction on the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor inputs. In particular, Assumption 1.(a) is equivalent to σ(k) >
α(k), where
σ(k) := W (k)f
′(k)
W ′(k)f (k) and α(k) :=
kf ′(k)
f (k) (10)
denote the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor inputs and capital share in
production respectively. Justification for Assumption 1.(a) is based on empirical observa-
tions made on the one hand by Klump et al. (10), and Chirinko (4) who report that the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor inputs is between 0.5 and 1 and on the
other hand by Gollin (7) who reports that capital share in production is between 0.32 to
0.40.
Assumption 1.(b), can be interpreted as a restriction on the income elasticity of demand
for the agricultural commodity. In particular, Assumption 1.(b) implies that the income
elasticity of demand for the agricultural commodity is less than one.i Justification for low
income elasticity is based on the empirical observation of Engel’s law made by Crafts (6),
Matsuyama (12), and Piyabha et al. (14).
Let us define a constant
k̂ := min {k ∈ R++|(k) = 0} . (11)
One can easily verify that if assumption 1.(a) is satisfied then (a) k → (k) is strictly
decreasing and positive on the interval (0, k̂), and (b)  satisfies the following bound-
ary conditions limk↓0 (k) = 1 and (̂k) = 1. At the same time, if assumption 1.(b) is
satisfied then A → U(A) is strictly decreasing and U(A) ∈ (0, 1) for any A ∈ (0,∞).
Proposition 1. If Assumption 1 is satisfied then (a) there exists a unique and interior
steady state in a closed economy, (K∗(A1),K∗(A2)); and (b) for any initial capital stocks,
(k10, k20) > 0, there exists a unique saddle path along which the economy converges
monotonically to (K∗(A1),K∗(A2)).
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Proof of the above Proposition can be found in Appendix. The above proposition
implies that, under autarky, there exists a unique and interior steady state to which the
world economy converges monotonically along the unique saddle path. Convergence hap-
pens for any initial distribution of capital stock, (k10, k20). Under Assumption 1, themodel
predicts that the economy with more efficient agricultural productivity accumulated
more capitalj and achieves higher steady state welfare.k This result can be tempting to
conclude that poor countries will benefit from foreign land ownership if such ownership
comes with the transfer of more efficient agricultural technology.l
Two country model
The positive link between agricultural productivity and capital accumulation demon-
strated above crucially depends on the closed economy assumption. To see this, consider
a world economy in which the foreign land ownership is allowed. Suppose the ownership
right comes with the transfer of agricultural productivity. Let efficiency in the agricultural
sector, in both countries, be described by the same parameter A (we can assume with-
out loss of generality that A = A2 > A1). On the one hand, capital accumulation in each
country implies the following equations to holdm
k1t+1 = W (k1t) − x1tpt and k2t+1 = W (k2t) − x2tpt . (12)




pt − U(Axit)xit W (kit)
)
f ′(kit+1) (13)
to hold for i = 1, 2. (12) and (13) with land market clearing condition x1t+x2t = 2 implies
that x1t = X(k1t , k2t , pt) should solve the following equation
f ′
[




W (k2t) − (2 − x1t)pt
] = pt − U(A(2−x1t))2−x1t W (k2t)
pt − U(Ax1t)x1t W (k1t)
. (14)
(12), (13), and (14) together implies that the evolution of the world economy under the
perfect foresight dynamics is described by the following time one map⎛⎜⎝ k1t+1k2t+1
pt+1
⎞⎟⎠ = N(k1t , k2t , pt) =
⎛⎜⎝ n1(k1t , k2t , pt)n2(k1t , k2t , pt)
n3(k1t , k2t , pt)
⎞⎟⎠ , (15)
where n1, n2, and n3 are given by
n1(k1, k2, p) := W (k1) − X(k1, k2, p)p
n2(k1, k2, p) := W (k2) − (2 − X(k1, k2, p))p (16)
n3(k1, k2, p) :=
(







Steady state analysis of the closed economy implies the existence of two symmetric steady
states (0, 0) and (K∗(A),K∗(A)) (in which both countries hold equal amounts of capital
and incomes are equalized) and two asymmetric steady states (0,K∗(2A)) and (K∗(2A), 0)
(in which one country holds positive amount of capital, while the other deteriorates to
zero level of capital). In order to investigate the existence of additional steady states, in
which both countries hold positive but different levels of capital, we refine Assumption 1.
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Assumption 2. Suppose production and utility functions are:
(a) f (k) = kα , where the parameter α ∈ (0, 1) describes the capital share in production;
(b) u(x) = x1−γ −11−γ , where the parameter γ ∈ (1,∞) describes the income elasticity of
demand on agricultural commodity;
One can easily verify that Assumption 2 is fully compatible with Assumption 1. Thus,
results obtained in Section The autarky case remains. It follows from (12), (13), and (14),
that for a given steady state distribution of land holding (x, 2− x), the steady state capital
pair (k1, k2) solves the following system of equations
(k1) = U(Ax) and (k2) = U(A(2 − x)). (17)
It follows from Assumption 2 and from expression (11) that k̂ = min{α 11−α , (1 − α) 11−α }
and the distribution of the steady state capital stocks in the world economy is given by











∈ (0, k̂). (18)
Price equalization implies that the steady state land holding in the home country, x, should
satisfy the following equation(x,A) = 0, where : (0, 2)×R+ → R and P∗ : R++ → R
are defined as
(x,A) := P∗(Ax) − P∗(A(2 − x)) and P∗(y) = AU(y)y
W (K∗(y))f ′(K∗(y))
f ′(K∗(y)) − 1 . (19)
Proposition 2. If αγ > 1 then ∂(x,A)
∂x |x=1 = 0 has a unique solution at A = Ac(γ ),





= 0 and limγ↑∞Ac(γ ) = 1. (20)
(a) If either αγ ≤ 1 or αγ > 1 and A ≤ Ac(γ ) then there exists a unique and symmetric
steady state in the world economy (K∗(A),K∗(A)), which is globally stable.
(b) If αγ > 1 and A > Ac(γ ) then there exists three interior steady states with land hold-
ings (xL(A), xH(A)), (1, 1), and (xH(A), xL(A)), where xL(A) = 2 − xH(A) ∈ (0, 1) solves
(x,A) = 0. Symmetric steady state (K∗(A),K∗(A)) is unstable, while two asymmetric
steady states
(K∗[AxL(A)] ,K∗[AxH(A)] ) and (K∗[AxH(A)] ,K∗[AxL(A)] ) (21)
are asymptotically stable.
The above Proposition implies that the parameter space (γ ,A) ∈ (1,∞) × (0,∞) can
be divided into two regions (see Figure 1). When either αγ ≤ 1 or αγ > 1 and A ≤ Ac(γ )
then the world economy converges to a symmetric steady state and thus the relatively poor
country with an inefficient agricultural sector will benefit from the land market liberal-
ization in the long run, while the relatively rich country with more efficient agricultural
sector will neither lose nor benefit from the land market liberalization.
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Figure 1 Parameter regions with unique andmultiple interior steady states..
If αγ > 1 and A > Ac(γ ) then the unique and symmetric steady state is unstable and
two asymptotically stable steady states
(K∗[AxL(A)] ,K∗[AxH(A)] ) and (K∗[AxH(A)] ,K∗[AxL(A)] ) (22)
exist as only possible long-run outcomes in the world economy. The possibility for the
existence of two asymmetric and interior steady states is shown in Figure 2. In such a
situation, a country with a relatively inefficient agricultural sector can either benefit or
lose from the land market liberalization. The long-run outcome depends on the relative
levels of the agricultural productivity and the capital stock at the time of land market
liberalization. In order to demonstrate the situation when a country finds itself in a disad-
vantage situation due to a land market liberalization, we consider the case when αγ > 1
and A = A2 > Ac(γ ). Suppose A1 ∈ (0,A), then the world economy under autarky will
converge to the steady state (K∗(A1),K∗(A)), where 0 < K∗(A1) < K∗(A). Suppose the
relatively poor country liberalizes the land market and the transfer of agricultural tech-
nology from rich to poor country occurs. Then the world economy will converge to the
steady state in which the distribution of land holdings is (x1, x2) = (xL(A), xH(A)), and
the distribution of capital is (K∗[AxL(A)] ,K∗[AxH(A)] ). It is clear that the home coun-
try will find itself in a disadvantaged situationn due to the land market liberalization if
A1 ∈ (AxL(A),A) and will benefit from the land market liberalization if A1 ∈ (0,AxL(A)).
This is visualized in Figure 3.
The main results obtained in the paper can be summarized by Figure 4. If either αγ ≤ 1
or αγ > 1 and the productivity of the agricultural sector in the relatively rich country is
sufficiently low, A ≤ Ac(γ ), then the world economy will converge to a symmetric steady
Figure 2 αγ>1. (a)Unique steady state, A < Ac(γ ) (b) Multiple steady states, A > Ac(γ ).
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Figure 3 αγ>1 andA>Ac(γ ). If A1 ∈ (0, AxL(A)) then the home country benefits from the land market
liberalization; If A1 ∈ (AxL(A), A) then the home country finds itself in a disadvantage situation due to the
land market liberalization.
state (K∗(A),K∗(A)) due to the land market liberalization. As a result, in the long run,
only the relatively poor country benefits from the liberalization process, while the rela-
tively rich country will sustain the same level of capital, income, and welfare in the long
run (see region NW , no-lose/win region, on Figure 4). If αγ > 1 and the productivity
of the agricultural sector is sufficiently high, A > Ac(γ ), then the world economy will be
divided into relatively rich and relatively poor countries even when the productivity across
countries is the same. Whether the land market liberalization helps or hurts the process
of capital accumulation and the long-run welfare depends on the relative strength of the
productivity improvement in the home country. In particular, if the productivity of the
agricultural sector in the home country is sufficiently low, A1 < AxL(A), then both coun-
tries will benefit from the land market liberalization, because 0 < K∗(A1) < K∗[AxL(A)]
Figure 4 αγ > 1 andA= A2>A1; Parameter regions when the relatively rich/poor country
benefits/loses from the landmarket liberalization.NW ,WW , andWL, refer to “no-lose/win”,
“win/win”, and “win/lose” situations respectively.
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and 0 < K∗(A) < K∗(AxH(A)) (see region WW , win-win region, on Figure 4). In con-
trast, if the productivity of the agricultural sector in the home country is sufficiently high,
A1 > AxL(A), then the home country will suffer while the foreign country will benefit
from the land market liberalization because K∗(A1) > K∗[AxL(A)] and 0 < K∗(A) <
K∗[AxH(A)] (see regionWL, win-lose region, on Figure 4).
Results and discussion
Themain goal of this paper was to analyze the effects of landmarket liberalization and the
transfer of agricultural technology on the dynamics of capital accumulation and on long
run welfare. The main results of the paper suggests that a policy maker should be careful
to use only positive feedback mechanisms that the foreign land ownership can create for
economic development, because in reality, several different links co-exist between the
foreign land ownership right and the long run economic development. That is why an
important lesson learned from this study is to be careful in any policy intervention; a clear
goal to speed up the process of development can indeed push the country even deeper
into an underdevelopment trap.
Conclusions
The paper considered a model of the world economy consisting of structurally identical
economies and analyzed the stability of a unique symmetric steady state with and without
foreign land ownership rights. This does not imply that initial differences in production
technology, consumer preferences, or land endowment are unimportant for the world
economy not to converge to the symmetric steady state. Instead, I demonstrated that even
a small amount of inequality, expressed in terms of initial capital stock, can be magni-
fied after foreign land ownership is allowed. I do not argue that foreign land ownership
should be blamed for non-convergence and other sources of inequality such as geog-
raphy, credit market imperfections, lack of transparency in corporate governance, and
poorly designed public policies, are unimportant sources for non-convergence. Instead, I
demonstrated that the foreign land ownership alone can create advantage/disadvantage
for initially rich/poor countries and halt the process of convergence.
The model was setup in such a way that the world economy in autarky converges
to a unique steady state, which is globally stable under rational expectations. In such
steady state, a country with a more productive agricultural sector accumulates more cap-
ital. Introduction of foreign land ownership rights puts a relatively rich/poor country
in a advantageous/disadvantageous situation and creates an upward/downward spiral of
high/low wage income, and high/low investment in domestic physical capital. The argu-
ment of the paper can be used to dispute the claim made in the World Bank annual
report that a large-scale foreign land acquisition is a way to reduce poverty (see World
Bank (17)). Instead, I argue that a large-scale foreign land acquisition in some cases can
create a “win–win” for rich investors and a “lose–lose” outcome for poor, land selling
countries.
Appendix
Lemma 1. Let the agent’s utility be given by (c, x) → log c + u(Ax). If x → xu′(x) is
strictly decreasing then the income elasticity of agricultural commodity demand is less
than unity.
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Proof. Let w and p denote current wage and land price, and let r1 and p1 denote next
period rate of return on capital and next period land price. Then it follows (2) that demand




pr1 − p1w. (23)
This implies that
d ln x(w, p)
d lnw =
1










1 + yu′(y) . (25)
y → yu′(y) is strictly decreasing (see Assumption 1) if and only if yu′′(y)u′(y) < −1. This with
(25) implies that yU
′(y)
U(y) < 0, which with (24) implies that
d ln x(w,p)
d lnw ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) An interior steady state of the closed economy i is a stationary pair (k∗i , p∗i ) which
solves (9).o The existence and uniqueness of the interior steady state K∗(Ai)
follows from (9) and from the following properties of  :  is strictly decreasing,
(̂k) = 0, and limk↓0 (k) = 1.
(b) In order to understand the dynamics of the economy, I evaluate the Jacobian
matrix of time one map at the unique and interior steady state k∗i = K∗(Ai). (4)
and (5) imply that
m11(k∗i , p∗i ) = W ′(k∗i ) and m12(k∗i , p∗i ) = −1, (26)
and
mi21(k∗i , p∗i ) = p∗i W ′(k∗i )
( f ′′(k∗i )
f ′(k∗i )
− f ′(k∗i )−1W (k∗i )
)
mi22(k∗i , p∗i ) = −p∗i f
′′(k∗i )
f ′(k∗i )
+ f ′(k∗i ).
(27)
(26) and (27) together imply that the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix











Since f ′(k∗i ) > 1 andW ′ > 0, it follows from (28) that T∗i > 0 and D∗i > 0. In
addition,
1−T∗i +D∗i = 1−f ′(k∗i )+f ′′(k∗i )W (k∗i )+f ′(k∗i )W ′(k∗i ) = W (k∗i )f ′(k∗i ) ′(k∗i ) < 0,
(29)
because  ′(k∗i ) < 0. (29) with T∗i > 0 and D∗i > 0 implies that a unique and
interior steady state is a saddle. Local properties of the interior steady state implies
the existence and uniqueness of a locally stable manifold, which is
one-dimensional, continuously differentiable manifold, tangential to the linear
space spanned by the eigenvector of the Jacobian matrix with eigenvalue less than
one. Global properties of the dynamical system given in equation (4) can be
established via the application of the Stable Manifold Theorem (see Hartman (9)
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and Guckenheimer and Holmes (8) for more details). Global invertibility of the
time one map with uniqueness of an interior steady state implies the existence and
global uniqueness of a perfect-foresight equilibrium which can be obtained
through the backward iteration of the locally stable manifold. Existence of the
globally stable manifold implies that for any ki0 there exists a unique pi0 such that
the pair (ki0, pi0) is on the globally stable manifold. The economy converges to
steady state equilibrium monotonically along the stable manifold. For any values
other than pi0, the economy steps on diverging path which is inconsistent with the
perfect foresight equilibrium. The same argument is used in (Böhm V, Kikuchi T,
Vachadze G: Natural resources and patterns of overtaking, Unpublished).
Lemma 2. Let us define a function Z :[ 0, ẑ]→ R, where ẑ := min{α, 1 − α}, as follows
Z(z) := γ − 1
α(1 − α)2
(α(1 − α) − z)(α − z)(1 − z)
1 − 2z . (30)
(a) If γ ∈ (1, 1
α
)
then Z(z) < 1 for z ∈[ 0, ẑ];
(b) If γ = 1
α
then Z(0) = 1 and Z(z) < 1 for z ∈ (0, ẑ];
(c) If γ ∈ ( 1
α
,∞) then Z(z) = 1 has a unique solution on the interval (0, ẑ);
Proof. It is easy to observe that Z(α(1 − α)) = 0 and
Z(0) = α(γ − 1)1 − α ∈
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(0, 1) if αγ < 1
1 if αγ = 1
(1,∞) if αγ > 1.
(31)
If α ∈ (0, 0.50], then ẑ = α, Z(α) = 0, and Z is strictly decreasing and positive on
(0,α(1 − α)). If α ∈ (0.50, 1), then ẑ = 1 − α and Z(1 − α) = 1 − γ < 0, and Z is strictly
decreasing and positive on (0,α(1 − α)). This implies the claim of the lemma.
Lemma 3. (a) If αγ < 1 then P∗ is strictly decreasing and satisfies the boundary
conditions limy↓0 P∗(y) = ∞ and limy↑∞ P∗(y) = 0;
(b) If αγ = 1 then P∗ is strictly decreasing and satisfies the boundary conditions
limy↓0 P∗(y) = α 2α−11−α (1 − α) α1−α and limy↑∞ P∗(y) = 0;
(c) If αγ > 1 then there exists a unique yc which solves the equation
γ − 1
α(1 − α)2
(α(1 − α) − [K∗(y)]1−α)(α − [K∗(y)]1−α)(1 − [K∗(y)]1−α)
1 − 2 [K∗(y)]1−α = 1. (32)
P∗ is strictly increasing on the interval (0, yc), strictly decreasing on the interval (yc,∞)
and satisfies the boundary conditions limy↓0 P∗(y) = limy↑∞ P∗(y) = 0;







(1 − α − [K∗(y)]1−α (y))(α − [K∗(y)]1−α)(1 − [K∗(y)]1−α)
1 − 2 [K∗(y)]1−α
(33)









(α(1 − α) − [K∗(y)]1−α)(α − [K∗(y)]1−α)(1 − [K∗(y)]1−α)
1 − 2 [K∗(y)]1−α
− 1.
(34)
(34) with Lemma 2 implies the monotonicity properties of P∗. We can observe that K∗ is
strictly increasing with
limy↓0 K∗(y) = 0 and limy↑∞ K∗(y) = k̂. (35)
(35) implies that, for any γ ∈ (1,∞), limy↑∞ P∗(y) = 0 and
lim
y↓0 P






∞ if αγ < 1
α
2α−1
1−α (1 − α) α1−α α if αγ = 1
0 if αγ > 1.
(36)
Proof of Proposition 2 Monotonicity of Ac follows from Lemmas 3 and 2 and from
expression (32). The same Lemmas also imply that (a) if αγ = 1 then K∗(Ac(γ )) = 0 and
thusAc(γ ) = 0; and (b) if γ ↑ ∞ then [K∗(Ac(γ ))] ↑ α(1−α) and thusAc(γ ) ↑ 1 because
U(A) and K∗(A) converges pointwise toU∞(A) and K∗∞(A) respectively as γ ↑ ∞, where
U∞(A) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if A < 1
0.50 if A = 1
0 if A > 1,
and K∗∞(A) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if A < 1
K∗(1) if A = 1
k̂ if A > 1.
(37)
Steady States: It follows from Lemma 3 that if αγ < 1 then (.,A) is continuous,
strictly decreasing, and satisfies the boundary conditions
limx↓0 (x,A) = ∞ and limx↑2 (x,A) = −∞. (38)
This implies that (x,A) = 0 admits a unique solution at x = 1. If αγ > 1 then
limx↓0 (x,A) = −P∗(2A) < 0 and limx↑2 (x,A) = P∗(2A) > 0. (39)
This implies that(x,A) = 0 can admits at most three solutions, xL(A) ∈ (0, 1), xM(A) =
1, and xH(A) = 2 − xL(A) ∈ (1, 2). If αγ > 1 then it follows from Lemma 2 that
(α(1 − α) − [K∗(A)]1−α)(α − [K∗(A)]1−α)(1 − [K∗(A)]1−α)
1 − 2 [K∗(A)]1−α =
α(1 − α)2
γ − 1 , (40)
admits a unique solution. Let A = Ac(γ ) denotes the solution. Lemmas 3 and 2 imply that
if A < Ac(γ ) then (.,A) is increasing at x = 1 and thus there exists a unique solution at
x = 1. In contrast, if A > Ac(γ ) then (.,A) is decreasing at x = 1 and thus (x,A) = 0
admits three solutions.
Stability: αγ > 1 and A > Ac(γ ) is a necessary and sufficient condition for instability
of symmetric steady state.
Sufficiency: In order to show that αγ > 1 and A > Ac(γ ) is a sufficient condition for
instability of symmetric steady state it is enough to show that the dynamical system (13)
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is locally unstable at k1 = k2 = K∗(A). This is equivalent to show that at least two roots
of the characteristic equation
Det
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
n11 − λ n12 n13
n12 n11 − λ n13
n31 n31 n33 − λ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ = 0, (41)
are more than unity in modulus. Characteristic roots of the Jacobian matrix solve the
following equation
(n11 − λ)2 (n33 − λ) + 2n12n13n31 − 2 (n11 − λ) n13n31 − (n33 − λ) n212 = 0. (42)
Grouping first and fourth and second and third terms together, we obtain that the
characteristic roots satisfy the following equation
(n11 − n12 − λ) (n11 + n12 − λ) (n33 − λ) − 2 (n11 − n12 − λ) n13n31 = 0. (43)
It follows from the above expression that
λ1 = n11 − n12, (44)
while λ2 and λ3 satisfy the following quadratic equation
λ2 − λ (n11 + n12 + n33) + (n11 + n12) n33 − 2n13n31 = 0. (45)
At symmetric steady state k1 = k2 = k∗, x1 = x2 = 1, and thus it follows from (14) that









1 − AU ′(A)U(A)
)
− p∗f ′′(k∗)f ′(k∗)−1
, (46)
and X3(k∗, k∗, p∗) = 0. This with (17) and (44) implies that
λ1 = W ′(k∗)
k∗
W (k∗) − AU
′(A)
U(A)
1 − p∗f ′(k∗) f
′′(k∗)




Since −AU ′(A)U(A) = (γ − 1)(1 − U(A)) and (k∗) = U(A), it follows from (47) that
λ1 > 1 ⇔ γ−1α(1−α)2
(α(1−α)−[k∗]1−α)(α−[k∗]1−α)(1−[k∗]1−α)
1−2[k∗]1−α > 1. (48)
This with (34) and with Lemmas 3 and 2 implies λ1 > 1 if and only if αγ > 1 and
A > Ac(γ ). In addition,
λ2 + λ3 = n11 + n12 + n33 = W ′(k∗) + f ′(k∗) − p∗f ′′(k∗) > 0, (49)
λ2λ3 = (n11 + n12) n33 − 2n13n31 = W ′(k)f ′(k) > 0, (50)





It follows from (49), (50), and (51), that both roots λ2 and λ3 are positive, real, and satisfy
0 < λ2 < 1 < λ3. I.e., λ1 ≥ 1 is a sufficient condition for local instability of the symmetric
steady state (k∗, k∗, p∗). Since there can exist atmost two interior asymmetric steady states
in the world economy, the local instability of the symmetric steady state should imply the
long run divergence.
Necessity: In order to show that αγ > 1 and A > Ac(γ ) is a necessary condition for a
long run divergence it is enough to show that whenever divergence happens then αγ > 1
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and A > Ac(γ ) is satisfied. Here the fact that there are at most three interior steady states
plays a crucial role. In particular, when there are more than three interior steady states
then the symmetric steady state can be locally stable but the divergence in the world
economy can still occur. However, when the number of interior steady states is at most
three then the local and global instability becomes equivalent.
Endnotes
aAmong these countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Georgia,
Guatemala, Guyana, Latvia, Madagascar, Poland, Romania, Thailand, and others.
bRecent scientific debate on land speculation (or land grabbing) can be found in a special
issue of Journal of Peasant Studies published in 2011 (Vol. 38, issue 2).
cAccording to FNP Institute, an agribusiness consulting firm in Sao Paulo, in 2007 alone,
farmland prices jumped by 16% in Brazil, by 31% in Poland, and by 15% in the Midwest-
ern United States.
dTwo key assumptions behind this result is the diminishing returns technology and low
income elasticity of agricultural demand.
eFor details about the standard neoclassical overlapping generations model see Azariadis
(2).
fCapital can be interpreted broadly to include human capital, physical capital, or any other
capital good used in production.
gMatsuyama (12) analyses the effect of agricultural productivity on economic growth and
shows that high agricultural productivity is a precondition for high economic growth in
case of autarky, while high agricultural productivity can become a barrier for economic
growth in case of free trade. This is so because, in case of autarky, rising agricultural
productivity makes it possible to free labor force from the agricultural sector. However,
in the case of free trade, high agricultural productivity causes the specialization in the
agricultural sector and leads to de-industrialization. In order to separate this feedback
mechanism from the one considered in this paper, we assume that the land is the only
factor for agricultural commodity production.
h Properties of f and u imply the existence and uniqueness of xit which solves (2).
iSee Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
jSince k → (k) and A → U(A) are both decreasing functions it follows that A →
K∗(A), where k = K∗(A) solves of (k) = U(A), is a strictly increasing function.
kRanking of steady state welfare across countries coincides with the ranking of steady state
capital because A → K∗(A) and A → ln (f (K∗(A)) − K∗(A)) + u(A) are both strictly
increasing functions.
lThis result is consistent with Matsuyama (12). Engel’s law plays a crucial role for this
result. If income elasticity is unity, then the steady state capital is independent from
productivity in the agricultural sector. If income elasticity is more than one, and so agri-
cultural commodity is a luxury good, then a rise in agricultural productivity decreases the
steady state capital.
m It is assumed that the young agents cannot invest in capital abroad. This assumption
can be easily justified if one interprets capital as human or public capital.
nAs above, ranking of steady state welfare coincides with the ranking of steady state capi-
tal because A → ln(f (K∗(A)) − K∗(A)) + u(A) is a strictly increasing function.
oIt is clear that (0, 0) is a corner steady state of the economy.
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